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PAUL'S STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION,
THIRD SERIES *-A REVIEW
Josiah T-Villard t

T

HIS Third Series of Mr. Paul's Studies in Federal Taxation is a
welcome addition to the literature on the subject. Too few members of the tax bar reduce their views on the subject to writing, and
many of those who do apparently feel that they must never concede
any merit to a contention of the treasury on any doubtful point, for
fear that such a concession will be used against them by some treasury
attorney in the future. On the other hand, many academic writers on
the subject tend to assume that every decision in favor of the taxpayer
represents a defeat for truth and justice. Mr. Paul avoids both these
pitfalls. Although an active practitioner, his approach to the various
problems involved is candid and impartial, and his treatment of them
reflects the approach of one who is primarily interested in achieving a
fair and workable system of taxation. This volume is even better than
its two predecessors in the thorough grasp of the topics discussed, and
in its extremely careful and accurate documentation.
Reorganizations

The volume consists of five chapters, each dealing with a separate
topic.1 About one-third of the book is devoted to the study of the treatment of reorganizations under the federal tax laws since r9r3. This
chapter gives a resume of the development of the statutory provisions
and court decisions dealing with reorganizations, and also sets forth in
detail the current statutes and regulations, so that the chapter is both a
guide to the investigation of any problem likely to arise under the present law, and an historical discussion and analysis of the subject. Since
the law with respect to reorganizations has reached a state of at least
temporary stability, the chapter can be read without the uneasy feeling
that a decision handed down since the publication of the book may have

*

STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION; Third Series. By Randolph, E. Paul-Visiting
Sterling Lecturer on Taxation, Yale University School of Law. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press. 1940. Pp. xvii, 539. $6.
A.B., LL.B., Harvard; member of the New York bar.-Ed.
1
Reorganizations, Revocable Trusts and the Income Tax, Federal Income Tax
Problems of Mortgagors and Mortgagees, Life Insurance, Annuities and the Income
Tax, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction.
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nullified most of the author's conclusions, a- feeling which unhappily is
not altogether unescapable in reading the other chapters of this book.
Mr. Paul points out that by r924 it became necessary to determine
what philosophy should underlie the statutory treatment of reorganizations; whether the statute should merely set forth general principles
which could be applied by the treasury department to specific c_ases as
they arose, or whether an attempt should be made to enact highly
articulated provisions designed to meet every conceivable transaction
that might arise. The latter view prevailed, and one judges that Mr.
Paul thinks that it was a mistake. Certainly it has not produced entirely
satisfactory results, and at times has seemed to produce a vicious circle.
Detailed and ably drafted as the statutory provisions were, they were
inevitably not detailed enough so that every business reorganization
could fit neatly into their terms, and almost every such reorganization
had certain loose edges which would not fit. The result was that counsel would try to smooth these rough edges and arrange the transaction in the form determined by the statute. The treasury would then
seize on these steps which had been taken to make the transaction fit
the statute, attack their bona fides and imply that these steps cast doubt
upon the entire reorganization.
On the other hand, no such difficulty faced the attorney who desired
to cast an isolated transaction of an individual taxpayer into the pattern
of a statutory reorganization. Unencumbered by the actualities of a
genuine business, he was free, with the assistance of a stenographer, to
create a perfect air-tight reorganization. It certainly seemed as if it was
impossible for a real business reorganization to meet the statutory tests,
while it was almost ridiculously easy for a spurious reorganization to
do so.
The spurious tax reorganization was pretty well stopped by the
Gregory case.2 The arm of the treasury has also recently been strengthened in this field by the Supreme Court's decision in the John Thomas
Smith case.8 Indeed, the Smith case has led to a widespread attack on
the corporate entity by the subordinate officials of the treasury, and it
1s still uncertain to what extent holding corporations are going to
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266 (1935), affirming (C. C.
A. 2d, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 809.
8
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 60 S. Ct. 355 (1940). It is interesting to note
that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in reversing per curiam the
board's decision in Curran v. Helvering, 114 F. (2d) 1018 (October 21, 1940), did
so on the authority of the Smith case, although the transaction involved more nearly
resembled a Gregory case transaction.
2
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survive the impact of this case. However, since personal holding companies are expressly recognized in the Internal Revenue Code/ and
subject to a very high surtax on their undistributed earnings, and since
the effect of certain transactions between corporations owned by the
same interests is carefully limited by the specific provisions of section
24(b) of the code, as well as by the older and more general provisions
of section 45 thereof, the general disregard of the corporate entity
would create much confusion and would be inconsistent with the apparent statutory plan. The approach of the courts in the Gregory and
Smith cases, namely to inquire as to the reality of the transaction of
which the corporation was a part, rather than as to the existence of the
corporation, seems the correct one. It is perhaps significant that the
doctrine of these cases has not been as yet used to disregard the entity
of a corporation in considering the tax liability of the corporation itself.
We see, therefore, that the license given to artificial reorganizations by the highly articulated statute has been curbed by the courts.
On the other hand, the difficulties of genuine business reorganizations
in meeting the precise statutory tests have not been so effectively
removed. True, one type of reorganization, the foreclosure in equity,
or under the bankruptcy act, has been assisted to achieve freedom from
tax by holdings of the courts that a bondholder may in certain cases be
regarded as a stockholder if the stock no longer has any value. 5 The
policy of these decisions seems somewhat doubtful, as ordinarily a
foreclosure or bankruptcy reorganization seems an appropriate occasion on which to recognize a gain or loss on an investment.
On the other hand, a more deserving type of reorganization has
been practically denied the sanction of the reorganization provisions
by the courts. This is the very common form of reorganization in
which a large publicly held corporation issues its stock for the assets of
a smaller corporation, and then causes the assets to be transferred to a
wholly owned subsidiary. For many years it was assumed that the
selling corporation received the stock of the acquiring corporation free
of tax. However, in a line of cases stemming from the Supreme Court's
decisions in the Groman and Bashford cases,6 the circuit courts of ap53 Stat. L. 104, § 500 et seq. (1939), 26 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 500.
Commissioner v. Kitselman, (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 458, cert. denied,
302 U.S. 709, 58 S. Ct. 29 (1937); Commissioner v. Newberry Lumber Co., (C. C.
A. 6th, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 447; Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 41 B. T. A.
324 (1940), on appeal Fifth Circuit.
6 Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 82, 58 S. Ct. 108 (1937); Helvering v.
Bashford, 302 U. S. 454, 58 S. Ct. 307 (1938).
4

5
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peal have held that the acquiring corporation in this type of reorganization is not "a party to the reorganization," and that accordingly
its stock when received by the selling corporation is not entitled to be
received free of tax. These decisions fly in the face of common business
realities and are very unfortunate. Whatever hope there was that the
circuit courts of appeal would modify this doctrine appears to have
been dashed by the affirmance by the eighth circuit of the board's decision in the Anheuser-Busch case. 7 As Mr. Paul intimates, the statutory
abolition of this doctrine appears desirable.
However, genuine business reorganizations were given real relief,
at least from uncertainty, if not from taxation, by the 1938 Revenue
Act which permitted closing agreements binding on the treasury with
respect to transactions before their consummation.8 The practice of
seeking closing agreements before entering into reorganizations is
already common, and it seems probable that eventually all reorganizations of any size will be first submitted to the treasury department for
a closing agreement. In cases where closing agreements are denied,
it would be a hardy counsel who would permit a taxpayer to effect the
reorganization on the assumption that it would be free from tax. 0
This practice may represent to a certain extent a belated victory for the
school of thought favoring general, rather than highly articulated, statutory provisions. The advantages.of this procedure are great, and outweigh some disadvantages which must be conceded, namely that a
taxpayer having the forethought to seek a closing agreement may
obtain a concession on doubtful points by the treasury department,
which the department on the strength of the authorities creating the
doubt may be litigating in cases of other less prudent taxpayers. The
possibility of such discrimination will, however, diminish as the practice of seeking closing agreements becomes more and more general, and
in the meantime the treasury is undoubtedly on guard against it.

Revocable Trusts

If the law with respect to reorganizations has reached a state of
temporary stability, the law with respect to the taxation of revocable
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Helvering, (C. C. A. 8th, Nov. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 662.
52 Stat. L. 573, § 801 (1938), amending 45 Stat. L. 874, § 606 (a) (1928),
now Internal Revenue Code (1939), § 3760.
9 Note the recently announced abandonment of a projected reorganization of the
Pepsi-Cola Company upon the refusal of the treasury to enter into a closing agreement.
90 NEW YoRK T1MES 43:1 (Dec. 12, 1940).
7
8
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trusts has never been so chaotic. The Clifford case 10 must be considered
as a starting point for the discussion of this problem, and most of the
decisions prior to that case are now of historical interest only. As is
always the case following the broad pronouncement of a new principle
of tax law by the Supreme Court, the implications of the decision are
uncertain and must be filled in by further decisions of the lower courts
and of the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court's decision jn
Douglas cv. Willcuts 11 was followed by great confusion in the decisions
of the board and the courts as to the extent of its application,12 and the
Supreme Court was forced in the Fitch, Leonard and Fuller cases 18
to define more precisely the scope of the broad doctrine originally
proclaimed. Similarly, the Clifford case is not, of course, the Supreme
Court's last word on the income tax status of trusts. To date no discernible trend is to be noted in the decisions of the board and the
courts, but it appears that some hope for grantors is left, and that not
every trust of which the grantor is the trustee will fall under the
Clifford case,1"' and that some short term trusts may even escape its
impact.15 However, there can be no doubt that the law on the income
tax status of trusts has left the comparatively safe moorings of sections
166 and 167 and is now afloat on the uncharted sea of section 22(a),
and what its ultimate destination will be no one can foretell.
Mr. Paul considers the important question of the extent to which
the statutory provisions of the gift tax, the income tax and the estate
tax with respect to trusts can or should be reconciled. He points out
the present difficulty of reconciling the effect of these taxes on trusts
because of the varying language in the statutes imposing the three
different taxes. He concludes that a reconcilation of the three statutes
is more the function of Congress than of the courts, and that the latter
should attempt to give each of the three statutes its proper scope and
significance without too much attention to the collateral effects of the
10

Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940).
296 U.S. I, 56 S. Ct. 59 (1935).
12
PAUL, page 247 et seq.
13
Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149, 60 S. Ct. 427 (1940); Helvering v.
Leonard, 310 U.S. 80, 60 S. Ct. 780 (1940); Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69,
60 S. Ct. 784 (1940).
u Commissioner v. Branch, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) II4 F. (2d) 985 (decided in
October); Helvering v. Palmer, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) n5 F. (2d) 368 (decided in
November), affirming per curiam 40 B. T. A. 1002 (1939).
15
Helvering v. Achelis, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) n2 F. (2d) 929; Re Lamont, 43
B. T. A., No. II (1940) (decided in December); Re Milbank, 41 B. T. A. 1014
(1940).
11
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other taxes. The income tax and the estate tax have lived together for
a long time in reasonable harmony, although their treatment of certain
types of trusts is not uniform. There has, however, been a judicial
tendency in construing the gift tax to hold that whatever is subject
to estate tax cannot be subject to gift tax. 16 But this postulate seems a
doubtful way to approach an interpretation of the gift tax, and indeed
the need for harmonizing these two taxes may be exaggerated. Any
gift tax paid on the transfer of property can be credited against the
estate tax if one is later paid on the same property. And certain types of
trusts, such as the trust in which the grantor reserves a life interest and
trusts made in contemplation of death, are inescapably subject to both
taxes.
There does, however, seem to be a real need either by statute or
decision, to correlate the gift tax and the income· tax. It is certainly
wrong for the treasury department to exact a gift tax on the creation of
a trust and then continue to tax the donor on the income of the property. This anomalous situation may well become common until and
unless the doctrine of the Clifford case is made more definite and the
number of trusts that are in the no-man's-land created by that decision
is reduced.
Conversely, it seems anomalous that certain trusts which are sufficient to deflect the income tax from the taxpayer should not be subj ect to gift tax.11
In discussing the taxation of alimony trusts, Mr. Paul concludes
that it would be desirable if Congress stepped in and relieved the hardpressed husband, reversed the doctrine of Gould v. Gould,1 8 allowed
the wife to pay income tax on alimony, and thus did away with the
necessity of the tortuous distinctions which have grown up under the
doctrine of Douglas v. Willcuts. 19 This solution seems sensible, since
divorce is not yet motivated by tax avoidance and there appears to be
Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939).
See Knapp v. Hoey, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 99, but see the Supreme
Court's comment thereon in Sanford's Estate v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39~ 60
S. Ct. 51 (1939). These cases involved trusts in which the granter reserved a right
to change beneficiaries,' except in his own favor. The board has held that the annual
payments of trust income to the beneficiaries are not annual gifts. Estate of Giles W.
Mead, ('B. T. A. Memo. Op. 1940) 403 C. C.H. FEDERAL TAX SERVICE, 1f 7166-B.
The board recently went further and held that annual payments of trust income under
a completely revocable trust were not taxable gifts. Re Warner, 42 B. T. A., No. 138
(1940). Sed quaere.
18 245 U.S. 51, 38 S. Ct. 53 (1917).
19 PAuL, 247 et seq.
16

17
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no good reason why alimony income should not be taxable to the recipient to the same extent as other income.20

Life Insurance
In his discussion of the status of life insurance and annuities under
the income tax law, Mr. Paul points out that insurance has in the last
decade been sold in very large amounts on its tax-saving possibilities
as well as on the conventional basis of protection of dependents. The
tax-saving claims made for insurance are only now being subjected to
the test of litigation in the courts.
One of the most interesting problems in this field is the status
under the income and estate tax laws of the combination life insurance
and annuity contracts, which have been widely sold in recent years.
This question will be very shortly settled, since the LeGierse and
Keller cases 21 are now pending before the Supreme Court. Mr. Paul
leaves no doubt that he agrees with the decision of the third circuit
in the Keller case, and in the light of the recent trend of Supreme
Court decisions in tax cases, one may risk a prophecy that this case,
rather than the LeGierse case, will be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The Keller Estate and LeGierse cases are both estate tax cases,
and not strictly within the title of Mr. Paul's chapter. It is perhaps
regrettable that since Mr. Paul was making this deviation into the
estate tax, he did not go further and discuss the important question
presented in the much reversed Bailey case.22 In this case the Court
of Claims at first held that proceeds of life insurance were subject to
estate tax in the estate of the insured even though he had irrevocably
assigned the policy to his wife, on the ground that section 302(g) of
the Estate Tax Law 28 should be construed literally when it required
the inclusion in decedent's taxable estate of the proceeds of "policies
taken out by the decedent upon his own life." This decision caused
consternation, as it was apparently contrary to treasury regulations
which had been accepted almost without reservation, and upon the
20 Discussion of the chapter on mortgagor and mortgagee problems has been
omitted because of the necessity for limiting the length of this review.
21 Commissioner v. LeGierse, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 1 IO F. (2d) 734, cert.
granted Oct. 14, 1940, 61 S. Ct. 32; Commissioner v. Keller's Estate, (C. C. A. 3d,
1940) 113 F. (2d) 833, cert. granted Oct. 14, 1940, 61 S. Ct. 50.
22 Bailey v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 617; modified on rehearing, 30 F. Supp. 184 (1939); again modified on rehearing, 31 F. Supp. 778 (1940);
cert. dismissed by stipulation, September 27, 1940.
28 Now Internal Revenue Code (1939), § 811 (g).
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strength of which insurance salesmen had sold hundreds of millions
of dollars of insurance. The Court of Claims, however, soon reversed
itself upon a rehearing on the ground that the donee had paid premiums
on the insurance after the assignment, although the reasoning of the
original opinion appeared to make this immaterial. Later after the
Supreme Court's decision in the Hallock case,2"' the court granted a
further rehearing and reversed itself in favor of the government
because of a possibility of reverter retained by the insured. While the
insurance world has recovered in large measure from the fright given
it by the Bailey case, tax lawyers have not entirely shaken off the fear
that the reasoning of the first opinion in the Bailey case may appear
again. Indeed, two circuit courts of appeals have intimated their belief
that the first Bailey opinion would have been correct except for conflicting treasury regulations. 25
Mr. Paul discusses the troublesome question of the treatment for
income tax purposes of insurance which has been purchased from the
insured. In the Hacker case 26 the taxpayer took out insurance on his
own life, paid the premiums for some time and then assigned the policy
to his wife for an amount equal to its cash surrender value. His wife
assigned the policy to their child, the petitioner, but reserved the right
to revoke the assignment. Upon the husband's death, the proceeds were
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940).
Broderick v. Keefe, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), II2 F. (2d) 293 at 295, where
the court said: "The language of Section 302 (g) appears to cover much more than
the Government claims for it, and seems broad enough to include the proceeds of
policies involving no transfer of property in a testamentary sense." And Chase Nat. Bank v.
United States, (C. C. A. 2d, Dec. 1940) CCH FEDERAL INHERITANCE, EsTATE & G1FT
TAX SERVICE, 1f 10,003, stating: "The language of Section 302 (g) is of the broadest
kind. It in terms includes in the gross estate of a decedent amounts receivable by all other
beneficiaries. Only because ofregulations and certain judicial decisions has Section 302 (g)
not been extended to cases where the insured has retained no interest in a policy taken
out on his own life. As an original question, even such a policy might have been thought
to fall within Section 302 (g) because of its inherent testamentary character." Compare
Re Rosenstock, 41 B. T. A. 635 (1940). For a discussion of this question prior to the
Bailey decisions, see Paul, "Life Insurance and Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV. L. REv.
1037 at 1052 (1939).
Since this review was written, the treasury department has amended the estate
tax regulations dealing with insurance and now makes the test of taxability the extent
to which premiums were paid by the decedent, rather than the possession by him of the
legal incidents of ownership. Apparently this change will not affect policies which were
irrevocably assigned prior to January 10, 1941, and on which no premiums are paid
by the insured after that date. T. D. 5032, amending Treas. Reg. So, arts. 25, 26, and
27, approved Jan. 10, 1941, and released Jan. 13, 1941.
26 36 B. T. A. 659 (1937).
24

25
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paid to the petitioner, and it was held that she was subject to income
tax on the excess of the proceeds over the amount paid for the policy
by the wife plus premiums paid. Since until the very moment of the
insured's death the wife could have defeated the petitioner's rights,
it would seem arguable that the proceeds should be taxable to her
rather than to the child. This case also presents gift tax difficulties.
Obviously, no gift was made, under the doctrine of Burnet v. Guggenheim 21 and Rasquin v. Humphreys,2 8 at the time of the assignment to
the petitioner, but the board held that the petitioner had received the
proceeds by gift from her mother, presumably on the date of the
death of the insured. Is such a gift taxable, and if so, is the value of
the gift the proceeds of the policy or the cash surrender value immediately prior to the death of the insured?
Mr. Paul also makes the disturbing suggestion that the income
tax principles of the Hacker case might be extended to cover the situation where the assignment by the insured to his wife was gratuitous and
she paid the premiums thereafter. This, however, seems doubtful and
apparently is not the treasury department's view. 29 Mr. Paul suggests
that any danger that the Hacker case might be so extended could be
avoided by having the insured continue to pay the premiums after the
assignment of the policy to his wife. This, however, would bring the case
under the second opinion in the Bailey case and probably would subject the policies to estate tax in the insured's estate, as well as raising
a question as to the status for gift tax purposes of the annual premium
payments. Thus, it would be impossible to escape either an estate tax
to the insured or an income tax to the donee.

Regulations
In his chapter on the use and abuse of tax regulations in statutory
construction, Mr. Paul is properly critical of the fiction that Congress
by re-enacting a statute impliedly approves the regulations promulgated
thereunder, and states 30 that this fiction "holds the record for un288 U.S. 280, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1933).
308 U.S. 54, 60 S. Ct. 60 (1939).
29
I. T. 3212, 1938-2 CuM. BuL. 65.
30
PAUL, page 426. This topic is the subject of two articles in the January issue of
the HARVARD LAW REVIEW: Brown, "Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue
Acts," 54 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1941); Griswold, "A Summary of the Regulations
Problem," 54 HARV. L. REv. 398 (1941). Both criticize the fiction of approval of
regulations by Congressional re-enactment. Professor Griswold thinks this doctrine
should be completely rejected, and thinks the weight to be given to regulations should
27
28
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realism" among all the innumerable fictions of the law. Certainly its
application in the Reynolds Tobacco Company case 81 offends common
sense. In this case the treasury had issued regulations which had stood
through several re-enactments of the statute. The treasury then changed
the regulations, and the regulations as changed stood through several
further re-enactments of the statute. The Supreme Court held that
Congress by re-enacting the statute while the first regulation was in
force had given this regulation the force of law. If this is true, it would
follow that by re-enacting the law while the amended regulation was in
force it had also given the new regulation the force of law. Does this
mean that Congress amends the law sub silentio? The absurdity of this
fiction is also shown by the last sentence of the Court's opinion in
Rasquin v. Humphreys, 82 where in speaking of a gift tax regulation
relied on by the commissioner, the Court said:
"Whatever validity the amended regulation of r936 may have
in its prospective operation, we. think it is so plainly in conflict
with the statute as to preclude its application retroactively.•.."
It is hard to see how a regulation which was "plainly in conflict with the
statute" could have any application prospectively or retroactively.
Mr. Paul points out how this doctrine embarassed the Court in
the Wilshire Oil Company 83 and Hallock84, cases, in which the Court
was forced to indulge in some very tortuous reasoning to escape the
entanglements of this doctrine. It would indeed seem that a fiction
which required the Court to impute an intention to Congress based on
the failure of Congress to change a statute while a treasury regulation
of which it undoubtedly knew nothing was in force had little excuse
for existence. It would be far better if this doctrine were completely
discarded and some new approach to the problem of the weight to be
given treasury regulations were made. Everyone knows that Congress
be tested by their "contemporaneousness" and "long continuedness." However, "contemporaneousness" seems a dubious test, since many of the most doubtful regulations
represent efforts of the treasury department to construe newly enacted provisions of
revenue acts so as to resolve all doubts in favor of the treasury, or even sometimes to
extend the meaning of the statute. Professor Griswold also favors Mr. Paul's suggestion
that the Supreme Court should grant prompt review to cases involving a conflict with a
treasury regulation without waiting for a conflict in the circuit courts of appeals.
81
Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. IIO, 59 S. Ct. 423 (1939).
See also Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264, 58 S. Ct. 880 (1938).
82
308 U .. S. 54 at 56, 60 S. Ct. 60 (1939).
88
Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90, 60 S. Ct. 19 (1939).
Si Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940).
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in re-enacting revenue acts does not intend to sanction treasury regulations issued thereunder, and no useful purpose would seem to be
served by assuming such an intent.
Perhaps the question could be approached by invoking the doctrine
of estoppel against the commissioner. The commissioner promulgates
the regulations, and it is hard to see why a taxpayer who relies on them
should have to defend their correctness against the commissioner himself. On the other hand, it is difficult to see why the commissioner in
defending his regulations should derive the benefit of an assumed
approval of them by Congress when it is known that the assumption
is purely fictitious. There are undoubtedly cases in which the commissioner is justified in amending retroactively or in refusing to follow
his own regulations, but these cases should be exceptional and the burden should be on the commissioner to convince the court in each case
of the reason for his change.
Mr. Paul suggests that this problem could be solved by assuring a
prompter review of disputed regulations, and requiring the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari in cases where decisions of a circuit court of
appeals or the Court of Claims are contrary to a treasury regulation.
This suggestion seems reasonable and practical. Less desirable, however, seems Mr. Paul's suggestion that the board of tax appeals should
pass upon the reasonableness and validity of any retrospective amendment to the regulations. While the board is in theory an administrative
agency and not a court, it is universally regarded as a judicial body by
those having any contact with it, and has earned wide respect as such.
It seems too bad to weaken its judicial character by inviting it to participate in a stage of the administration of the law prior to the' decision
of actual cases.
It is to be hoped that Mr. Paul will continue these studies in the
constantly expanding and shifting field of federal taxation and thereby
increase his claims on the gratitude of the profession.

